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A ‘divide and choose’ approach to compromising∗
PETER POSTL†
Abstract
We study dispute resolution in the compromise model of Bo¨rgers and Postl (2009), which
provides an alternative framework for analyzing the real-world procedure of tri-offer arbitration
studied in Ashenfelter et al (1992). Two parties involved in a dispute have to choose between
their conflicting positions and a compromise settlement proposed by a neutral mediator. We ask
how an adaptation of the familiar ‘divide and choose’ mechanism (DCM) performs as a proto-
col for dispute resolution in the absence of an arbitrator. We show that there is a unique equi-
librium of the DCM if the parties’ von Neumann Morgenstern utilities from the compromise
settlement are drawn independently from a concave distribution, or from any Beta-distribution
(which need not be concave). Furthermore, for Beta-distributions that concentrate increasing
probability mass on high von Neumann Morgenstern utilities of the compromise, the social
choice rule implied by the DCM is asymptotically ex post Pareto efficient.
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1 Introduction
The study of different arbitration procedures for settling two-party conflicts occupies a promi-
nent position in the literature on dispute resolution. These procedures differ with regard to
the amount of discretion they allow the arbitrator in imposing a binding settlement on the two
parties (Farmer and Pecorino, 2008). Two commonly used procedures are: conventional arbi-
tration, where the arbitrator can impose any settlement he deems appropriate; and final offer
arbitration, where the arbitrator must select one of the two parties’ conflicting positions (see
Ashenfelter et al (1992), Brams et al (1991), and chapter 3 in Brams (2003), for an overview of
these procedures). A third procedure - one that curtails arbitrator freedom while still allowing
for the possibility of a compromise settlement - is tri-offer arbitration. Under this procedure,
which is used to resolve public sector labor disputes in Iowa (Ashenfelter et al, 1992), the arbi-
trator must select either one of the two parties’ favored positions, or a compromise settlement
proposed by a neutral mediator prior to the start of the arbitration process.
In this note, our focus is on the collective choice problem at the heart of tri-offer arbitra-
tion: should the two parties to the dispute choose a settlement favored by one of the parties, or
should they select the compromise settlement? Our objective is to devise a protocol for dispute
resolution that does not require the presence of an arbitrator, and which can be implemented by
the parties themselves. One motivation is that with arbitration, there remains the issue of arbi-
trator selection regardless of the chosen arbitration procedure.1 If the two parties must engage
in some protocol for arbitrator selection, why not let them engage directly in a dispute reso-
lution protocol? To address this question, we follow the approach to fair-division procedures
in Brams and Taylor (1996) by assuming that any settlement emerging from such a protocol is
binding on the two parties, just like the settlement imposed by an arbitrator would be.
A natural framework for studying tri-offer dispute resolution (both with and without an arbi-
trator) is the compromise setting of Bo¨rgers and Postl (2009). The mechanism design approach
taken there offers a perspective on the arbitrator’s decision problem that is different from, but
complementary to the way arbitrator behavior is modeled in Ashenfelter et al (1992): there,
the arbitrator has exclusive knowledge of what constitutes the true ‘fair’ settlement in the dis-
pute, and he will choose whichever feasible settlement is closest to it. In contrast, Bo¨rgers and
Postl (2009) assume that the two parties hold privately relevant information about their pref-
erences, such as their respective von Neumann Morgenstern utilities derived from the neutral
mediator’s compromise settlement. Under arbitration, the onus is on the arbitrator to elicit this
information truthfully.2 The main impossibility result in Bo¨rgers and Postl (2009) implies that
incentive compatible tri-offer arbitration generally fails to implement (ex post) Pareto efficient
settlements.
We propose here a conflict resolution protocol for the compromise setting of Bo¨rgers and
Postl (2009) that combines aspects of classic ‘divide and choose’ mechanisms with aspects of
ultimatum bargaining.3 Under our protocol, a proposer (selected randomly from among the
two parties involved in the dispute) suggests a lottery involving only the two parties’ respective
favored settlements. If the other party (the ‘responder’) agrees to the proposed lottery, then his
1de Clippel et al (2012) study this problem, along with specific procedures for selecting an arbitrator.
2The idea of taking a mechanism design approach to arbitration in a two-party dispute when the arbitrator lacks
information about the parties’ preferences can be traced back to Rosenthal (1978).
3See Brams and Taylor (1996) for an overview of divide and choose mechanisms, under which one agent
partitions a (possibly heterogeneous) good into two, while the other agent chooses whichever partition he wants.
Divide and choose mechanisms have also been proposed for the dissolution of indivisible partnerships, with one
partner proposing a price, and the other partner deciding whether to sell his share or purchase the other partner’s
share at that price. See, e.g., Morgan (2004).
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favored settlement will be implemented with the probability specified by the proposer’s lottery.
If, instead, the responder rejects the proposed lottery, the compromise settlement previously
suggested by the neutral mediator is implemented.
In what follows, we show that under our ‘divide and choose’ protocol, both proposer and
responder have a unique type-contingent equilibrium strategy for a vast class of distributions of
von Neumann Morgenstern utilities (namely for all concave distributions, as well as the entire
class of Beta-distributions, which contains concave and convex distributions, in addition to
distributions that change curvature from one to the other). We then investigate the performance
of our protocol with respect to the ex ante expected welfare it generates. While under the
uniform distribution our protocol is outperformed by a mechanism proposed in Bo¨rgers and
Postl (2009) (the so called ‘cropped triangle rule’), we show that for Beta-distributions which
concentrate increasing amounts of probability mass on high realizations, our protocol converges
to an (ex post) Pareto efficient settlement.
2 Model
2.1 Basic Setup
Two agents i = 1,2 must choose one alternative from the set {a0,a1,a2}. Each agent i prefers
alternative ai over alternative a0, and alternative a0 over alternative a−i (subscript −i refers
to the agent other than i). These ordinal preferences are common knowledge. We refer to
alternative a0 as the compromise because it is the middle-ranked alternative for both agents.
Agent i’s von Neumann Morgenstern utility function is ui : {a0,a1,a2} → R. Utilities are
normalized so that ui(ai) = 1 and ui(a−i) = 0 for all i. These aspects of the von Neumann
Morgenstern utility functions are common knowledge. For each agent i we denote by ti the
utility of the compromise ui(a0). We refer to ti as agent i’s type. We assume that ti is a random
variable which is only observed by agent i. The agents’ types are stochastically independent,
and they are identically distributed with cumulative distribution function G. We assume that G
has support [0,1], that its derivative g is continuous, and that g(ti)> 0 for all ti ∈ (0,1). The joint
distribution of t ≡ (t1, t2) is common knowledge among the agents. In most of the following, we
assume that G is the parameterized Beta-distribution, which has density g(ti) = h(ti)/B(α,β )
and cumulative distribution function G(ti) = H(ti)/B(α,β ), where h(ti) ≡ tα−1i (1− ti)β−1,
H(ti)≡
∫ ti
0 τ
α−1(1− τ)β−1dτ , and B(α,β )≡ H(1) for α,β > 0.
2.2 Divide and Choose Mechanism (DCM)
We consider here an adaptation of the familiar ‘divide and choose’ mechanism as a way of
making a collective choice in the compromise setting described above. The rules of this adapted
DCM are as follows: one of the two agents is chosen randomly as the ‘proposer’. Each agent
has probability 1/2 of being proposer. If agent i is selected as proposer, he suggests to the other
agent a lottery over their respective favorite alternatives {ai,a−i}. That is, the proposer chooses
a probability p ∈ [0,1] with which the other agent’s favorite alternative is chosen by the lottery.
The other agent, the ‘responder’, then chooses between saying ‘yes’ or ‘no’. If the responder
says ‘yes’, then the responder’s favorite alternative a−i is implemented with probability p, and
the proposer’s favorite alternative ai is chosen with probability 1− p. If the responder says
‘no’, then the compromise a0 is implemented.
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2.3 First best mechanisms and welfare
In order to evaluate the performance of the DCM, we shall draw below on comparisons with
first best social choice rules. A social choice rule (SCR) is a function that assigns to every
pair of the agents’ types a lottery over the set of alternatives. I.e. f : [0,1]2→ ∆({a0,a1,a2}),
t 7→ ( f0(t), f1(t), f2(t)), where fi(t) (i= 1,2) is the probability that agent i’s favorite alternative
is selected, and f0(t) is the probability that the compromise is selected. A SCR is first best if
t1+ t2 > 1⇒ f0(t) = 1 and t1+ t2 < 1⇒ f0(t) = 0. In addition to a comparison of first best
SCRs with the SCR implied by the DCM, we wish to compare the performance of these rules
according to the ex ante expected social welfare they generate. Noting that the components
f0(t), f1(t), and f2(t) of any SCR f sum up to 1 for all t, we can express as follows the ex ante
welfare of f , given by the sum of the agents’ ex ante expected utilities:
W ≡ 1+
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
0
f0(t)(t1+ t2−1)g(t2)dt2
)
g(t1)dt1 (1)
3 Results
3.1 Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium of the DCM:
Proposition 1. For all concave distributions, and all Beta-distributions, the unique equilibrium
of the DCM features the following strategies:
(i) The proposer assigns probability p(ti) to the responder’s favorite alternative where, for
every ti ∈ [0,1], p(ti) is the unique value p ∈ (0,1) that solves:
1− p− G(p)
g(p)
= ti (2)
(ii) The responder says ‘yes’ if t−i < p(ti), and says ‘no’ otherwise.
Proof. The proof is by backward induction. Consider first the responder j. If p is the probabil-
ity assigned by the proposer i to the responder’s favorite alternative, then the responder should
say ‘yes’ if t−i < p. Otherwise, he should say ‘no’. Given the probability distribution of t−i,
this implies that the responder will say ‘yes’ with probability G(p).
Now consider the proposer’s decision problem. If he offers a probability p for the respon-
der’s favorite alternative and the responder says ‘yes’, then the proposer’s utility will be 1− p.
If, instead, the responder says ‘no’, the proposer’s utility will be ti. Therefore, the proposer’s
expected utility is:
G(p)(1− p)+(1−G(p)) ti (3)
An optimal choice p(ti) (i.e. one that maximizes the proposer’s expected utility) must satisfy
the first-order necessary condition in (2), which is obtained by setting equal to zero the first
derivative of expected utility in (3), and then dividing this equation by g(p). It is easy to see
that for concave distributions G, each proposer-type ti has a unique optimal choice p(ti). This
follows immediately from the fact that if g′(p) < 0 for all p, then the left-hand side of (2) is a
decreasing function of p with derivative −2+G(p)g′(p)/g(p)2. However, concavity of G is
4
only sufficient, but not necessary for uniqueness of the proposer’s optimal choice. In order to
show that uniqueness prevails for a vast class of distributions, we focus in the following on the
case where G is the parameterized Beta-distribution. The reason is that this class includes both
concave and convex distributions, as well as distributions whose curvature changes from one to
the other.
In order to prove item (i) of Prop. 1 for the Beta-distribution, we denote by σ(p|α,β )
the function on the left-hand side of (2), which is given by 1− p−H(p)/h(p) under the Beta-
distribution. We can then express the necessary condition in (2) more succinctly as σ(p|α,β )=
ti. The key component of the proof of item (i) is an investigation of the monotonicity properties
of the function σ . Our findings, derived formally in the Appendix, are illustrated graphically in
Fig. 1, which depicts representative graphs of σ for Beta-distributions with β > 1, β = 1, and
β < 1, resp. As the figure shows, σ has a unique root p0 in the interval (0,1), and is strictly
decreasing on [0, p0].4
Β=1
Β<1
Β>1
p0 p0 p0 1
p
-1
ti
1
ΣHpÈΑ,ΒL
Figure 1: Representative graphs of σ for different Beta-distributions
It is obvious from Fig. 1 that for Beta-distributions with β ≥ 1, every proposer-type ti ∈ [0,1]
has a unique optimal choice p(ti). This is follows immediately from the fact that the function
σ is strictly decreasing. For β = 1, where h(p) = pα−1 and H(p) = pα/α , it is easy to verify
that σ displays the monotonicity properties illustrated in Fig. 1:
σ(p|α,1) = 1− α+1
α
p and p0 =
α
α+1
(4)
For Beta-distributions with β < 1, Fig. 1 shows that every proposer-type ti > 0 has a unique
value p(ti) that satisfies the necessary condition in (2). However, for the type ti = 0 there are
two such values: p = 1 and p = p0 ∈ (0,1). To see that the optimal choice of the type ti = 0 is
p= p0 rather than p= 1, note that this type’s expected utility in (3) is zero for p= 1, while it is
(1− p0)H(p0)/B(α,β )> 0 for p= p0. Therefore, Beta-distributions with β > 1 also generate
a unique optimal choice p(ti) for every proposer-type ti ∈ [0,1].
Given the unique equilibrium of the DCM, a natural question is how the SCR implied by the
DCM compares with a first best SCR. We address this question in Corollary 1 below, indicating
4Note that the specific value of p0 depends on the distribution-parameters α and β .
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the probability of the compromise which is the only component of the SCR that affects social
welfare:
Corollary 1. The SCR fˆ implied by the equilibrium of the DCM in Prop. 1 features the follow-
ing probability of the compromise:
fˆ0(t1, t2) =

0 if t2 < ¯
s(t1)
1/2 if
¯
s(t1)< t2 < s¯(t1)
1 if t2 > s¯(t1)
(5)
where
¯
s(t1)≡min{σ(t1|α,β ),σ−1(t1|α,β )} and s¯(t1)≡max{σ(t1|α,β ),σ−1(t1|α,β )}.
Proof. Observe that the function σ , when restricted to the subset [0, p0] of its domain, is in-
vertible because it is strictly decreasing for all Beta-distributions. Denoting the inverse by σ−1,
we can express the proposer’s optimal choice in item (i) of Prop. 1 as p(ti) = σ−1(ti|α,β ).
Consequently, item (ii) of Prop. 1 can be re-stated as follows: the responder says ‘yes’ if
t−i < p(ti|α,β )⇔ ti > σ(t−i|α,β ); otherwise, the responder says ‘no’. Since each agent has
equal chance of being the proposer, we obtain the probability of the compromise in (5).
f` 0Ht
1,
t 2L
=
1
f` 0Ht
1,
t 2L
=
0
f `
0 Ht1 ,t2 L=12
f `
0 Ht1 ,t2 L=12
0 Α
Α+1
1
0
Α+1
Α
1
t1
t 2
Figure 2: Prob. of compromise under DCM for uniform distribution
Fig. 2 provides an illustration of the probability of the compromise implied by the DCM
when agents’ types are drawn from the uniform distribution (i.e. α = β = 1).5 As there are
type-pairs below the cross-diagonal in the unit square for which the DCM implements the
compromise, it is easy to see that the probability in (5) differs markedly from the one associated
with a first best SCR (as described in Section 2.3).
As it is difficult in general to characterize Beta-distributions for which the probability of
the compromise implied by the DCM approximates first best, we focus in the remainder of this
note on Beta-distributions with β = 1. The reason is that for these distributions, the probability
of the compromise in (5) converges to first best for large α . By (4), limα→∞σ(p|α,1) = 1− p,
5In this case, by (4): σ(p|1,1) = 1− 2p and p0 = 1/2. Similar figures, albeit with nonlinear σ , emerge for
Beta-distributions with β 6= 1.
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limα→∞ p0 = 1. Given this observation, we explore in the next section how ex ante welfare
under the DCM changes with the distribution-parameter α .
3.2 Welfare
In this section, we study ex ante expected welfare under the DCM when the agents’ types
are drawn from a Beta-distribution with β = 1 and variable distribution-parameter α . There
are two distinct advantages to working with this particular class of distributions. The first,
already mentioned in the previous section, is that the probability of the compromise implied
by the DCM converges to first best for large α . The second advantage is that we can compute
analytically ex ante expected social welfare of the DCM. This is not possible for general Beta-
distributions, for which one has to resort to numerical welfare-comparisons.
Note that because the two agents are ex ante symmetric and equally likely to be the proposer,
we can compute ex ante welfare of the DCM under any Beta-distribution as an expectation over
all type-pairs for which the compromise is chosen when agent 1 is the proposer. For the special
case of Beta-distributions with β = 1, this yields the following expression, where Γ denotes the
Gamma function:6,7
Wˆ (α,1) = 1+
∫ 1
0
(∫ 1
α+1
α (1−t1)
(t1+ t2−1)αtα−12 dt2
)
αtα−11 dt1
=
2αΓ(12 +α)+
(
4+ 4α
)−α α√pi Γ(α)
(1+α)Γ(12 +α)
(6)
Fig. 3 shows a graph of ex ante welfare Wˆ (α,1) associated with the DCM. As a benchmark,
the figure also depicts as a dashed curve the ex ante welfare under a first best SCR.8 Note from
Fig. 3 that ex ante welfare under the DCM converges to the first best welfare-level as the
distribution-parameter α grows. This is not surprising, as the probability of the compromise
implied by the DCM converges to first best as α → ∞. What appears more surprising is the
non-monotonicity of Wˆ (α,1), especially when noting that the probability of not choosing the
compromise goes to zero under the DCM as α vanishes. Note, however, that for vanishing
α , the type-distribution H(ti)/B(α,β ) concentrates ever more probability mass on very low
realizations (i.e. types close to zero). This, in turn, leads to a negligibly small probability that
type-pairs (t1, t2) materialize for which the compromise is chosen when it should not be.
We can conclude that for both very small and large α the chance of an inefficient collective
choice by the DCM is very small. Note that relative to first best, a maximal ex ante welfare loss
of 12.45% occurs when α ≈ 0.174. Under the uniform distribution (α = 1), the relative welfare
loss is 3.571%. This is clearly much larger than the welfare loss of 0.0191% generated by the
cropped triangle rule in Bo¨rgers and Postl (2009). Note, however, that their characterization
of the cropped triangle rule, especially the associated probabilities fi(t) that are needed to give
the agents incentives for truthful revelation of their types, pertains exclusively to the case of
6Recall that Γ(α)≡ ∫ ∞0 e−xxα−1dx.
7We integrate over all type-pairs (t1, t2) s.t. t2 > σ−1(t1|α,1)≡ (α+1)(1− t1)/α , which captures all events in
which agent 1 is the proposer and the compromise is chosen because agent 2 says ‘no’. While it is straightforward
to evaluate the inner integral in (6) w.r.t. t2, we have used the ‘Integrate’-function implemented in Mathematica
8.0.4 for Windows (64-bit) to compute analytically the outer integral w.r.t. t1.
8First best welfare is
(
α2Γ2(α)(1+α)+2αΓ(2α+2)
)
/(1+α)Γ(2α + 2), which we have verified using
Mathematica.
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the uniform distribution. We can therefore view the present results on the DCM as providing a
lower bound on the welfare loss associated with any welfare-maximizing incentive compatible
social choice rule for a much wider range of type-distributions.
0 1 2 3
Α0
0.5
1
1.5
W
`
HΑ,1L
Figure 3: Welfare under DCM and first best (dashed) for Beta-distributions with β = 1
4 Appendix
The results presented in this appendix concern the monotonicity properties of the function
σ : [0,1]→ R, p 7→ σ(p|α,β ) = 1− p−H(p)/h(p) associated with the parameterized Beta-
distribution. We start by investigating the behavior of σ at the boundaries of its domain.
Lemma 1. For all Beta-distributions, the function σ takes the value σ(0|α,β ) = 1 at p = 0.
Proof. The value σ(0|α,β ) depends on how the ratio H(p)/h(p) behaves as p → 0. We
show in items (i)-(iii) below that limp→0 H(p)/h(p) = 0. While limp→0 H(p) = 0 for all Beta-
distributions, the value of limp→0 h(p) depends on the distribution parameter α:
(i) For α < 1, limp→0 h(p) = ∞. We can write H(p)/h(p) as p1−α(1− p)1−βH(p). The
desired result follows because limp→0 p1−α = 0 and limp→0(1− p)1−β = 1.
(ii) For α = 1, the result follows immediately since limp→0 h(p) = 1.
(iii) For α > 1, limp→0 h(p)= 0. Using l’Hoˆpital’s rule, we can establish: limp→0 H(p)/h(p)=
limp→0 h(p)/h′(p) = limp→0 p(1− p)/((α−1)(1− p)− (β −1)p) = 0.
Lemma 2. For all Beta-distributions, the function σ is nonpositive at p = 1.
Proof. The value σ(1|α,β ) depends on how the ratio H(p)/h(p) behaves as p→ 1. We show
in items (i)-(iii) below that limp→1 H(p)/h(p) ≥ 0. While limp→1 H(p) = B(α,β ), the value
of limp→1 h(p) depends on the distribution parameter β :
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(i) For β < 1, limp→1 h(p) = ∞. As H(p)/h(p) = p1−α(1− p)1−βH(p), it follows imme-
diately that limp→1 H(p)/h(p) = 0.
(ii) For β = 1, limp→1 h(p) = 1. Thus, limp→1 H(p)/h(p) = B(α,β )> 0.
(iii) For β > 1, limp→1 h(p) = 0. Thus, limp→1 H(p)/h(p) = ∞.
In the following Lemmas 3-5, we show formally that the monotonicity properties of σ
indicated in Fig. 1 emerge for any Beta-distribution with β > 1, β = 1, and β < 1 resp. To give
the reader a better sense of how the more general results will be established below, we start by
considering the simplest case of Beta-distributions with α = 1:
Lemma 3. Consider the subclass of Beta-distributions with α = 1: those with β ≥ 1 generate
a function σ that is strictly decreasing in p. For the remaining ones (i.e. those with β < 1), the
function σ has a unique root p0 ∈ (0,1), with σ(p|1,β )> 0, σ ′(p|1,β )< 0 for all p ∈ [0, p0),
and σ(p|1,β )< 0 for all p ∈ (p0,1).
Proof. For Beta-distributions with α = 1, it is straightforward to compute:
σ(p|1,β ) = 1− p− 1− (1− p)
β
β (1− p)β−1 and σ
′(p|1,β ) =−2+ 1− (1− p)
β
β (1− p)β−1 ·
1−β
1− p (A.1)
By distinguishing the cases β ≷ 1, we can use the derivative σ ′ in (A.1) to establish the follow-
ing additional properties of σ :9
I. For β > 1, limp→1σ ′(p|1,β ) =−∞, and σ ′(p|1,β )< 0 for all p∈ [0,1).10 This, together
with item (ii) of Lemma 1 and item (iii) of Lemma 2 implies that σ has a unique root at
some p0 ∈ (0,1).
II. For β < 1, σ has a unique turning point at p1 ≡ ((1−β )/(1+β ))1/β : σ ′(p1|1,β ) = 0,
with σ ′(p|1,β )< 0 for all p < p1, and σ ′(p|1,β )> 0 for all p > p1. Furthermore, σ is
negative at this point: σ(p1|1,β )< 0.11 This implies that σ has two roots: one at some
point p0 ∈ (0, p1), and the other at 1. To see this, note first that σ is strictly decreasing
on [0, p1). Therefore, it has a single root p0 within this interval. Next, note that since
σ is strictly increasing on (p1,1] and σ(1|1,β ) = 0, its sole root within this interval is
p = 1.
We now establish the monotonicity properties of the function σ for Beta-distributions with
α,β 6= 1. For this, we need both the first and second derivatives of σ . We state these derivatives
here before presenting in Lemmas 4 and 5 our monotonicity results along with their proofs.12
Note that we suppress for simplicity the dependence of σ on the distribution-parameters α and
β . I.e. we write henceforth σ(p) instead of σ(p|α,β ).
σ ′(p) =−2+λ (p)µ(p) (A.2)
9For β = 1 the result in Lemma 3 is obvious from the expression for σ in (4).
10This follows because (1− p)β >−(β −1)/(β +1) for all p.
11To see this, use the fact that σ ′(p1|1,β ) = 0 to obtain an expression for (1− (1− p1)β )/β (1− p1)β−1. Then
substitute this expression into σ(p1|1,β ) in (A.1). This yields σ(p1|1,β ) =−(1− p1)(1+β )/(1−β )< 0.
12We omit in the following all straightforward derivations for the sake of brevity.
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where λ (p)≡ H(p)/h(p) and µ(p)≡ (α−1− p(α−1+β −1))/p(1− p). Observe that:13
lim
p→0
σ ′(p) =−α+1
α
and lim
p→1
σ ′(p) =
{
∞ if β < 1
−∞ if β > 1 (A.3)
Note that the first derivatives of the functions λ and µ are given by:
λ ′(p) = 1−λ (p)µ(p) and µ ′(p) =−(α−1)(1− p)
2+(β −1)p2
p2(1− p)2
By differentiating (A.2) w.r.t. p and substituting in the expression for λ ′(p), we can write as
follows the second derivative of σ :
σ ′′(p) = λ ′(p)µ(p)+λ (p)µ ′(p) = (1−λ (p)µ(p))µ(p)+λ (p)µ ′(p) (A.4)
Lemma 4. For any Beta-distribution with α 6= 1 and β > 1, the function σ is strictly decreas-
ing.
Proof. We show by contradiction that σ ′(p) < 0 for all p ∈ [0,1]. We distinguish Beta-
distributions with α < 1 and α > 1:
I. Let α < 1. Suppose there is an interval I⊂ (0,1) s.t. σ ′(p)≥ 0 for all p∈ I. Then, for any
p∈ I it must hold by (A.2) that: µ(p) = (−(1−α)− p(−(1−α)+β−1))/p(1− p)> 0,
which is equivalent to the statement: 1−α > β −1 and p > (1−α)/(1−α−(β −1))>
1. This constitutes a contradiction as p < 1 for all p ∈ I.
II. Let α > 1. Observe from (A.2) and (A.3) that σ ′(0)< 0 and σ ′(p)≤−2 for all p∈ [p¯,1],
where p¯≡ (α−1)/(α−1+β −1). Now suppose there exists an interval (l,u)⊂ (0, p¯)
s.t. σ ′(p) > 0 for all p ∈ (l,u). Then there is a turning point p1 < l s.t. σ ′ changes sign
from ‘−’ to ‘+’: σ ′(p1) = 0 and σ ′′(p1)> 0. This leads to a contradiction: to see from
(A.4) that σ ′′(p1) < 0, note that: (i) σ ′(p1) = 0⇔ λ (p1)µ(p1) = 2 (this follows from
(A.2)); (ii) µ(p1)> 0 as p1 < p¯; and (iii) µ ′(p1)< 0.
Lemma 5. For any Beta-distribution with α 6= 1 and β < 1, the function σ has a unique root
p0 ∈ (0,1), with σ(p)> 0, σ ′(p)< 0 for all p ∈ [0, p0), and σ(p)< 0 for all p ∈ (p0,1).
Proof. Recall that for β < 1: σ(0)= 1, σ ′(0)=−(α+1)/α , σ(1)= 0, and limp→1σ ′(p)=∞.
These properties imply that σ must cross the horizontal axis at least once, and that there is an
interval (p1,1] on which σ is increasing as it approaches 0 from below for p→ 1. Thus, σ must
have a turning point p1, with σ(p1) < 0, at which the derivative σ ′ changes sign from ‘−’ to
‘+’. We argue by contradiction that p1 is the unique stationary point of σ . To do this, we show
that if there are multiple stationary points, then σ ′ must change sign from ‘−’ to ‘+’ at each
one of them: σ ′′(pˆ) > 0 for every stationary point pˆ. This leads to the desired contradiction,
because if σ ′ changes sign from ‘−’ to ‘+’ at a stationary point p1, it cannot again change sign
from ‘−’ to ‘+’ at another stationary point p2 without previously having changed sign from
‘+’ to ‘−’ at a stationary point between p1 and p2. To see that σ ′′(pˆ)> 0 for every stationary
point pˆ, we distinguish Beta-distributions with α < 1 and α > 1:
13The first limit is obtained by L’Hoˆpital’s rule: limp→0 H(p)/h(p)p(1− p) = limp→0 1/(α(1− p)− β p) =
1/α; the second limit follows as limp→1 H(p)/h(p)p(1− p) = ∞.
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I. Let α < 1. Note from (A.2) that if pˆ is a stationary point, then µ(pˆ)> 0. Also, σ ′(pˆ) =
0⇔ λ (pˆ) = 2/µ(pˆ). Therefore, the second derivative of σ in (A.4) becomes:
σ ′′(pˆ) =−µ(pˆ)+2((1−α)(1− pˆ)2+(1−β )pˆ2)/µ(pˆ)pˆ2(1− pˆ)2 (A.5)
We now show indirectly that σ ′′(pˆ)> 0. Suppose instead that σ ′′(pˆ)≤ 0. By (A.5):
2
(
(1−α)(1− pˆ)2+(1−β )pˆ2)/pˆ2(1− pˆ)2 ≤ (µ(pˆ))2
Substituting in the explicit expression for µ(pˆ) given above, we can state after straight-
forward manipulation that σ ′′(pˆ)≤ 0 iff:
(1−α)(1− pˆ)2(1+α)+(1−β )pˆ2(1+β )≤−2(1−α)(1−β )pˆ(1− pˆ)
The latter inequality involves a contradiction because the left-hand side is positive, while
the right-hand side is negative. We can therefore conclude that σ ′′(pˆ)> 0 for all station-
ary points pˆ, as required.
II. Let α > 1. Note first that µ(p) > 0 for all p ∈ [0,1]. Now consider a turning point pˆ at
which σ changes sign from ‘−’ to ‘+’. I.e. σ ′′(pˆ)> 0, with:
σ ′′(pˆ) =−µ(pˆ)−2((α−1)(1− pˆ)2+(β −1)pˆ2)/µ(pˆ)pˆ2(1− pˆ)2
Substituting in the explicit expression for µ(pˆ) given above, we can state after straight-
forward manipulation that σ ′′(pˆ)> 0 iff:(
(α−1)(1− pˆ)2+(β −1)pˆ2)/(a−1− pˆ(a−1+b−1))2 <−1/2 (A.6)
Note that the ratio on the left-hand side of (A.6) is a monotonically decreasing function
of p.14 This implies that (A.6) also holds for any stationary point p˜ > pˆ, and therefore
σ ′′(p˜)> 0. As σ ′(0)< 0, we know that the first sign-change of the derivative σ ′ is from
‘−’ to ‘+’. Therefore, we must have σ ′′(pˆ)> 0 for all stationary points pˆ of σ .
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